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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
0000O0000

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 940241-CA
BRANT K. STRAUSBURG,
Priority No. 2
Defendant/Appellant.
0000O0000

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction

is conferred

on

the

court

pursuant

to

Rule

26(2) (a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3 (2) (d)

(Supp. 1994), whereby a defendant in a circuit

court criminal action may take an appeal to the court of appeals
from a final order on a misdemeanor offense.

In this case the

Honorable James S. Sawaya, Judge, Third Circuit Court, in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Murray Department, rendered final
judgment and conviction for the offenses of DRIVING UNDER THE
INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL, a Class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 41-6-44, and LEAVING THE SCENE OF AN INJURY ACCIDENT,
a Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-29.
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following statutes are attached as addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-29.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1.

Did the trial court err in admitting scientific HGN

test results without proper foundation as required by Rule 702, or
a finding of inherent reliability?

2.

Did the trial court err in admitting statements of

defendant taken without benefit of Miranda warnings?

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
An appellate court reviews the admissibility of evidence under
a correction of error standard.
scientific

evidence

a

In reviewing the admissibility of

reviewing

court

must

determine

if

the

scientific test meets the Utah standard of inherent reliability.
State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 397 (Utah 1989).

In determining

if scientific evidence is admissible, the reviewing court must find
that "the scientific principles or techniques have been properly
applied to the facts of the particular case by qualified persons
and that the testimony is founded on that work."

Xd. at 398, n. 7.

The "ultimate question" of whether a confession was obtained
legally

is

a

question

of

law

which

this

Court

reviews

for

correctness. See generally State v. Miller, 829 P. 2d 132 (Utah App.
1992).

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Mr. Strausburg appeals his conviction for Driving Under the
Influence of Alcohol Causing an Injury Accident on the grounds that
the arresting officer was not qualified to validate the scientific
principles supporting the relationship between alcohol ingestion
and nystagmus, that recent scientific literature demonstrate the
unreliable nature of HGN evidence; and that admission of the HGN
result in this case was reversible error.

A motion to suppress

the results of the HGN test was filed with the Third Circuit Court,
Murray Department, on March 2, 1994. The Honorable James S. Sawaya
heard argument in chambers before trial on March 3, 1994.

The

defense motion to suppress results of the HGN test was denied.
The defendant also appeals his convictions for Driving Under
the Influence Causing an Injury Accident and Leaving the Scene of
an

Injury

Accident

because

the

officer

illegally

obtained

a

confession from Mr. Strausburg without first giving him Miranda
warnings.

FACTS
On March 4, 1994, a jury found Mr. Strausburg guilty of two
charges:

(1)

Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol Causing an

Injury Accident (hereinafter "DUI") in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-6-44 (1953 as amended}; and (2) Leaving the Scene of an Injury
Accident in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-29 (1953 as amended)
Trial Transcript, 237 (hereinafter "T. Tr. 11 ).
A car accident occurred at the intersection of 900 East and
3

5600 South on the Van Winkle expressway.

Britt McGrath's car was

in the northbound lane when it was struck by a "white truck" making
a left-hand turn onto Van Winkle.

Ms. Mcgrath's car was propelled

into the back of Letecia Epple's car.
middle of the intersection.
injuries in the accident.

Both cars ended up in the

T. Tr. 21.

Both women

suffered

T. Tr. 21, 29.

Mr. Strausburg was arrested in the early morning hours of May
6, 1993.
Richards

A police officer with Granite School District, David
(hereinafter

"Richards")

heard

a

bulletin

from

the

sheriff's office that they were trying to locate "a vehicle that
had been involved in a hit-and-run accident on Van Winkle.

The

description was a white diesel-type tractor pulling a red flatbed
trailer." T Tr. 38. Richards spotted the vehicle at 3300 South and
500 East.

Id.

He approached the cab and talked to the occupants.

When Sergeant Mohler (hereinafter "Mohler") arrived, Richards left.
T. Tr. 43.

Mohler examined the truck and noticed white transfer

paint on the trailer of the vehicle.

T. Tr. 50.

This vehicle

matched the description Mohler had been given at the scene of the
accident.

Mohler

deputies--Deputy
Christensen.

then

Mortensen,

the

Deputy

scene

over

Wooten,

to three

and

Deputy

other
Paul

T. Tr. 54.

Mohler approached
occupants.

turned

the cab of the vehicle

to talk to the

The driver, Brant Strausburg, was told that there had

been an accident on Van Winkle and the people in the other cars had
been injured.

T. Tr. 56-57.

At this point, Mr. Strausburg was not

formally put under arrest for a DUI, but he was the prime suspect
4

in the hit-and-run accident and was not free to leave. T. Tr. 63.
Without mirandizing the defendant, Mohler elicited information from
Mr. Strausburg that he had come from Wasatch Boulevard, headed down
to 3300 South until he reached 500 East. T. Tr. 55.

After further

questioning, Strausburg admitted to being at the scene of the
accident on Van Winkle.

Deputy Mohler did not testify about any

odor of alcohol coming from the cab or the occupants or that he
suspected Mr. Strausburg had been drinking.
Deputy David Mortensen (hereinafter "Mortensen") arrived at
the

scene

and

briefly

talked

to

Richards

and

Mohler.

When

Mortensen contacted Strausburg, he noticed the odor of alcohol and
that his speech was "slightly slurred, but he was understandable."
T. Tr. 72.

Mortensen asked Strausburg to perform

some

field

sobriety tests. T. Tr. 70.

Mr. Strausburg informed the officer

that he had a back problem.

T. Tr. 103.

The first field sobriety test Mortensen asked Strausburg to
perform was the "finger count" test.

Mortensen said, "I asked him

to start on his pinkie with his thumb as an indicator and count
one, two, three, four, four, three, two, one.

I asked him to touch

tip to tip, and I asked him to do the test three times.

Then I

demonstrated it, one, two, three, four, four, three, two, one; one,
two, three, four, four, three, two, one; one, two, three, four,
four three, two, one.

I then asked him if he understood the test

and to start the test."

T. Tr. 74. Strausburg never miscounted or

double tapped a finger.

Strausburg did not touch his fingers tip

to tip and performed the test one more time than asked.
5

Based on

that, the officer said Strausburg failed the test.

T. Tr. 75-76.

The second test he was asked to perform was the "one-legged
stand".

Mortensen asked Strausburg to keep his hands at his side

and lift one leg three to six inches off the ground, extend his
toes, and keep his knee locked while looking hat his foot.
asked to count from 1,001 to 1,015.

He was

Mortensen looked for hopping,

if Strausburg used his arms for balance, if he put his foot down,
or if he stopped the test.
his foot down at 'five.'

According to Mortensen, Strausburg put
He restarted the test and finished with

perfect compliance. Mortensen failed Strausburg because he put his
foot down once.

T. Tr. 77.

The next test given was the "heel to toe" test.

Strausburg

was asked to walk a line, heel to toe, with his hands to his sides.
He was asked to take seven steps up, rotate and return nine steps.
Commenting on his performance, Mortensen stated, "I believe he used
his arms for balance, had a hard time balancing.
I didn't notice any other signs."

Other than that

T. Tr. 78.

Strausburg was also asked to do an "alphabet" test.

The

instructions were to say the alphabet twice, starting with 'B' and
ending with
Mortensen.

'S'.

Strausburg did the test exactly as asked by

However, on the second time through the alphabet, he

started with the letter 'A' rather than the letter 'B' . T. Tr. 82
On cross-examination, Mortensen admitted that

Strausburg's

balance was good and that he has seen people do a lot worse on the
field sobriety tests than Strausburg did.

T. Tr. 93-97.

The final test Strausburg was ordered to perform was the
6

horizontal gaze nystagmus test (hereinafter "HGN"). Mortensen held
a stimulus, in this case a pen, 12 to 15 inches in front of Mr.
Strausburg's

eyes.1

He then slowly moved

the pen across Mr.

Strausburg's filed of vision "until the eyes cannot move further to
the side."

T. Tr. 80, 1984 NHTSA Study, 3.

Mortensen was looking for three things as he administered the
HGN test:

(1) the angle of onset of nystagmus2 in each eye, T. Tr.

80, 1984 NHTSA Study, 4; (2) lack of smooth pursuit, T. Tr. 81,
1984 NHTSA Study, 4; and (3) the presence of nystagmus at maximum
deviation, (i.e., when the eye is moved as far as possible to one
side), T. Tr. 80, 1984 NHTSA Study, 4.
Mortensen did not mention his training in HGN although he
alluded to HGN training in D.R.E. (drug recognition expert) school.
T. Tr. 66, 99.

His other training consisted of 40 hours per year

in "law enforcement related" topics. T. Tr. 65
Mortensen did not testify that he has any scientific degrees,

1

The procedures for administering the HGN are outlined in
two National Highway Traffic Safety Administration publications:
Tharp,
Burns, Moskowitz,
Development
and
Field
Test
of
Psychophysical Tests for DWI Arrests, U.S. Dep't of Transportation,
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Office of Driver
and Pedestrian Research, DOT-HS-8-01970 (March 1981) (hereinafter
"1981 NHTSA Study"); (2) Improved Field Sobriety Testing, U.S.
Dep't
of
Transportation,
National
Highway
Traffic
Safety
Administration, DOT HS 806 512 (January 1984)(hereinafter "1984
NHTSA Study").
2

Nystagmus is an involuntary rapid movement of the eyeball,
which may be horizontal, vertical or rotary."
Dorland's
Illustrated Medical Dictionary 1068 (25th ed. 1974) . Nystagmus
"may be present at rest, or it may occur with eye movement."
McCance & Huether, Pathophysiology: The Biologic Basis for Disease
in Adults and Children, 415 (C.V. Mosby 1990) .
7

or scientific expertise in the fields of neurology, ophthalmology,
chemistry, physiology, or any subject showing how alcohol might
affect the human body.

No testimony by Mortensen explains the

cause of nystagmus or the underlying cause or relationship between
alcohol

ingestion

acknowledge

and

nystagmus.

that nystagmus

Mortensen

did,

however,

is caused by substances other than

alcohol and that some people in the population exhibit natural
nystagmus.
by

T. Tr. 101-102.

He knew that nystagmus can be caused

syphilis, measles, brain injury, epilepsy, eye muscle fatigue,

drugs and certain diseases.

T. Tr. 99-101.

Mortensen did not

testify how he was able to distinguish alcohol nystagmus from other
forms of nystagmus or if he was able to.
Mortensen stated that the angle of lateral deviation must be
estimated.

"It depends on the person and their build.

say, yeah, it would be exact on every person"

I can't

T. Tr. 81.

This

presents a problem with the accuracy and consistency of the HGN
result.

He also acknowledged that there are disagreements in the

scientific community about the angle of onset of nystagmus, that
some consider it 51 degrees, while others consider the onset to be
at 30 or 35 degrees.
angle.

T. Tr. 101.

Mortensen uses a 45 degree

Mortensen did not use a template, as recommended by the

NHTSA, to determine the angle of onset, but rather estimated the
angle from practice.

T. Tr. 81.

Mortensen concluded that Mr. Mortensen's eyes showed "a lack
of swift pursuit" and there was a noticeable nystagmus at the 45
degree onset.

T. Tr. 81.
8

Mr. Strausburg challenged the State's use of HGN arguing that
1)

the test is not an inherently reliable scientific test, and

2)

the officer administering the test was not qualified as an expert
to administer the test or to interpret the results.

The court

denied Mr. Strausburg's Motion to Exclude the HGN.
After the last field sobriety test, Mortensen placed Mr.
Strausburg under arrest.

T. Tr. 83. Mr. Strausburg did not submit

to a chemical test. T. Tr. 85. There was therefore no evidence of
Mr. Strausburg's blood alcohol content (hereinafter "BAC").

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The HGN test results are scientific evidence and must meet the
admissibility requirements of Utah Rule of Evidence 702.
police

officer

was

not

qualified

to

validate

the

The

scientific

principles supporting the relationship between alcohol ingestion
and nystagmus because he had no medical degrees or scientific
training of any kind.

As a result, the officer was not qualified

to administer the HGN.
The HGN test is unreliable.

Recent scientific

literature

disputes the accuracy and reliability of the HGN results because
there is disagreement about the angle of onset of nystagmus and
because officers do not properly conduct the HGN test, making the
results unreliable.
The defendant was not given Miranda warnings prior to being
questioned by the police.

He was questioned while seated in the

cab of the truck in the presence of several officers.
9

As such, he

was in police custody and should have been given proper warnings
before being interrogated.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING HGN TEST RESULTS,

A.
THE HGN TEST RESULTS ARE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE AND MUST MEET THE
ADMISSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 702, AND THE
INHERENT RELIABILITY STANDARD ARTICULATED BY THE UTAH SUPREME
COURT.
(1) THE HGN TEST
Nystagmus is one of three types of abnormal ocular movements3
defined as "an involuntary rapid movement of the eyeball, which may
be horizontal, vertical, rotary, or mixed."
Medical

Dictionary

1068

Huether, supra, at 415.

(25th ed.

1974),

Dorland's Illustrated
see

also

McCance

&

In horizontal or "jerk" nystagmus "one

phase of the eye movement is faster than the other."

McCance &

Huether, supra, at 415.
HGN was first used by law enforcement in California in the
late

1960's

consumption.

to

identify

suspected

of

barbiturate

See generally Ludington, Impaired Driving: HGN Test,

60 ALR 1129, 1131;
Nystagmus

persons

Test

1981 NHTSA Study;

and

Admissibility

of

Tenney, The Horizontal Gaze
Scientific

Evidence,

New

Hampshire Bar Journal, 1 Vol. 27:3, 180 (Spring 1986) . "The theory
behind

the

gaze

nystagmus

test

3

is

that

there

is

a

strong

The other two types of abnormal ocular movements are
strabismus and paralysis of individual extraocular muscles.
McCance & Huether, supra at 415. The primary symptom of strabismus
is double vision. Strabismus is caused by a "weak or hypertonic
muscle in one of the eyes." .Id. Trauma, cranial nerve pressure,
and various diseases may cause paralysis of specific extraocular
muscles. The primary symptom of paralysis of specific extraocular
muscles is drooping of the eye. Id.
10

correlation between the amount of alcohol a person consumes and the
angle of onset of the nystagmus."
1112

(Kan.

1992)

(quoting

State v. Witte, 83 6 P.2d 1110,

Carper

& McCamey,

Scientific Proof of DUI?, 77 111. B.J. 146, 147

Gaze

Nystagmus:

(1988)).

Most

people, however, will exhibit some nystagmus or jerking as their
eyes track to the extreme side.

Witte, 836 P.2d at 1112 (citing

1983 NHTSA Study).
The 1984 NHTSA Study outlines the procedures for administering
the HGN.

The officer should first ask the suspect to remove

glasses or hard contact lenses.

1984 NHTSA Study, at 3 . A suspect

is then ordered to keep his head still and to follow the stimulus - usually a pen, flashlight, or the officer's finger -- with his
eyes only.

Icl.

The officer then moves the stimulus across the

suspect's field of vision until the eye moves to the extreme side.
Id.

The 1984 NHTSA Study recognizes that some suspects will move

their heads4; the officer is thus instructed to use a flashlight
or his free hand for a chin rest. Id.
When conducting the HGN, the officer looks for three signs in
each eye: (1) angle of onset occurring before 45 degrees in each
eye;5

(2)

ability

of

the

eye

to

follow

the

moving

object

4

Head movement will affect the officer's estimation of angle
of onset, thus affecting the result of the test.
See Rouleau,
Unreliability of the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test, 4 Am Jur Proof
of Facts 3d 439. For that reason, the 1984 NHTSA Study requires
officers learning how to conduct the HGN to use a template when
determining the angle of onset. 1984 NHTSA Study, at 3.
5

An angle of onset of 45 degrees or less is said to
correlate to a blood alcohol content (hereinafter "BAC") of .10.
1981 NHTSA Study at 82-83, R. 283-84.
NHTSA contends that the
sooner the angle of onset, the higher the BAC.
Several recent
11

smoothly;6

and (3) the presence of moderate or distinct nystagmus

when the eye is moved as far as possible to the side.
Study at 4.

1984 NHTSA

If the officer finds four of the possible six clues,

then he can "classify [the suspect's] [blood alcohol content] BAC
as above .10 percent."

Id.

(2) THE HGN TEST AND ITS RESULTS ARE BASED ON SCIENTIFIC PRINCIPLES
The

large

majority

of

the

jurisdictions

considering

the

admissibility of HGN test results have found the test to be based
on scientific principles.

State v. Witte, 836 P.2d 1110, 1116

(Kan. 1992) (The HGN test is based upon scientific principles and
exceeds common knowledge);

State v. Superior Court, 718 P.2d 171,

178 (Ariz. 1986) ("The HGN test is a different type of test from
balancing

or walking

a straight

line because

it rests

almost

entirely upon an assertion of scientific legitimacy rather than a
basis of common knowledge.");

Ex Parte Malone, 575 So. 2d 106, 107

(Ala. 1990) (admission of HGN without showing test's reliability or
scientific basis upon which it is based rendered admission of test
results reversible error);

People v. Williams, 3 Cal. App. 4th

studies question the reliability of the 45 degree angle of onset.
See generally Pangman, Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus: Voodoo Science,
2 DWI Journal 1, 2 (1987) (citing Toglia, Electronystagmography:
Technical Aspects and Atlas (1976)) (50%-60% of sober individuals
will exhibit nystagmus indistinguishable from alcohol nystagmus
when deviating eyes more than 4 0 degrees to the side) ; Rouleau,
supra at 453
(citing recent studies demonstrating lack of
correlation between angle of onset and predicted BAC).
6

The 1984 NHTSA Study instructs the officer to "be sure that
the jerkiness was not due to your moving the object in a jerky
manner." 1984 NHTSA Study at 4.
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1326, 1334, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 130 (1992)) (conclusion drawn from HGN
results based on knowledge, training, and experience which was
clearly beyond common experience);

Commonwealth v. Miller, 367 Pa.

Super. 359, 365-66, 532 A. 2d 1186 (1987) (expert testimony required
to

establish

adequate

foundation

officer's interpretation of HGN);
881, 811 P.2d 488 (1991);

regarding

results

of

police

State v. Garrett, 119 Idaho 878,

State v. Armstrong, 561 So. 2d 883, 887

(La. App.) writ denied 568 So. 2d 1077

(La. 1990);

State v.

(Mo. App. 1989);

State v.

Borchardt, 224 Neb 47, 58-59, 395 N.W. 2d 551 (1986);

People v.

Wheeler,

764 S.W.

2d 523, 524-25

Torrev, 144 A.D. 2d 865, 866, 534 N.Y.S. 2d 807 (1988);

State v.

Reed, 83 Or.App. 451, 454-55, 732 P.2d 66 (1987);

State v. Barker,

179 W. Va. 194, 197-98, 366 S.E. 2d 642 (1988);

State v. Clark,

234 Mont. 222, 762 P.2d 853 (1988); State v. Grier, 791 P.2d 627,
631 (AK App. 1990).
The

large

majority

of

jurisdictions

require

that

a

Frye

standard (Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) or
similar

guarantee

of

trustworthiness

admitting the test into evidence.
Court,

718

P. 2d

at

179

(Ariz

be

demonstrated

before

See e.g.. State v. Superior
1986)

(proponent

of

HGN

must

demonstrate that scientific principle has gained general acceptance
in scientific community, "subject to a foundational showing that
the expert was qualified, the technique was properly used, and the
results were accurately recorded.")7
7

Three states hold that HGN is not Scientific Evidence:
State v. Bresson, 51 Ohio St. 3d 123, 129, 554 N.E. 2d 1330
(Ohio 1990)
(HGN different from other scientific tests such as
13

(3) THE FRYE STANDARD IN UTAH
The trial court found that the HGN was a scientific test
subject to the admissibility requirements of Utah Rule of Evidence
702 and the Philips inherent reliability standard, see Philips v.
Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228, 1230 (Utah 1980) ; Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 398
(Utah 1989).

Rule 702

states:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form
of opinion or otherwise.
While

rule

702

is the general

rule

for admissibility

of

scientific evidence, "where expert testimony is based upon novel
scientific

principles

additional

tests of admissibility

evidence]."

or techniques, courts have
that antedate

Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 396.

long
the

imposed

[rules of

The purpose for imposing

a more restrictive test for judging the admissibility of scientific
evidence, as a threshold matter, is to insure that only reliable
evidence go to the finder of fact.

The court noted the danger of

admitting unproven scientific principles:
One danger
of fact to
issues and
inability

being guarded against is the tendency of the finder
abandon its responsibility to decide the critical
simply adopt the judgment of the expert despite an
to accurately appraise the validity of the

Polygraph because no special equipment required.
Officer must
establish knowledge of test, training, and ability to interpret
observations for test to be admissible) . State v. Murphy, 451
N.W.2d 154, 156 (Iowa 1990) (Iowa adopts liberal approach to
admissibility of technical information -- unnecessary to establish
foundation for HGN evidence through scientific testimony); and
Finlev v. State, 809 S.W. 2d 909, 913-14 (Tex. App. 1991) (HGN
admissible through lay or expert witness to prove intoxication, but
may not be used to prove exact BAC).
14

underlying science.
Rimmasch, 775 P. 2d at 396.
technique.

HGN is a novel scientific principle or

See e.g., Witte, 836 P.2d at 1116.

In Philips, 615 P.2d at 123 0, the Utah Supreme Court outlined
the standard for admissibility of novel scientific evidence noting
first the paradigm case in the field, Frye v. United States, 293 F.
1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).

The Court, in quoting Frye, stated:

scientific tests still in experimental stages should not be
admitted in evidence, but that scientific testimony deduced
from a 'well recognized scientific principle or discovery' is
admissible if the scientific principle from which the
deduction is made is 'sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs.'
Philips, 615 P.2d at 1233 (quoting Frye, 293 F. at 1014) .
The court went on to articulate a standard of admissibility
termed "inherent reliability" which maintains the basic framework
of the Frye standard:
Tests that have passed from the experimental stage may be
admissible if their reliability is reasonably demonstrable.
An analysis of the admissibility of scientific evidence, while
taking into account general scientific acceptance and
widespread practical application, must focus in all events on
proof of inherent reliability.
Philips, 615 P.2d at 1234 (citations omitted).
The admissibility of scientific evidence may be presented in
two different ways:

(1) a request that the trial court

take

judicial notice of the inherent reliability of the testimony's
foundational principle; or (2) a request for an evidentiary hearing
where evidence is presented in support or against the claim of
inherent reliability.

Rimmasch, 775 P. 2d at 398.

In the first

instance, judicial notice, the proponent must demonstrate "a very
15

high level of reliability . . . " before a court may take judicial
notice of the test's scientific reliability.

Ld. Kofford v. Flora,

744 P.2d 1343, 1348 (Utah 1987) (scientific scholars in relevant
field unanimously agree that HLA paternity test is reliable).
Under

Philips,

Kofford,

and

Rimmasch,

the

proponent

of

scientific evidence that is not suitable for judicial notice must
make

an

initial

foundational

showing

that

the

principles

or

techniques underlying the proffered testimony meet the standard of
inherent reliability. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 398. In the absence of
such an initial showing the evidence is excluded.

.Id.

In either

case, once the threshold requirement for inherent reliability is
established, the court must still determine if the offered evidence
is helpful to the trier of fact. JEd. at 398 n. 4.

(trial court

required to balance probativeness of proffered evidence against
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury).

B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ADMITTING THE RESULTS OF THE HGN TEST
WITHOUT REQUIRING THE CITY TO PRESENT EXPERT TESTIMONY REGARDING
THE INHERENT RELIABILITY OF THE TEST
The State presented no expert testimony regarding the inherent
reliability

of

the

HGN

test

within

the

relevant

scientific

community.

And, there is no basis that the court should take

judicial notice of the HGN's inherent reliability. R. 109.
relevant

The

field of qualified experts remains largely undefined.

Compare Superior Court, 718 P.2d at 191-92 (recognizing behavioral
psychology,

highway

safety,

neurology,
16

and

criminologists

as

relevant scientific field); Grier, 791 P. 2d at 629 (neurologist and
pathologist

comprise relevant

reliability

of

arrest);

HGN

for

scientific

limited

purpose

field for
of

determining

probable

cause

to

Williams, 5 Cal Rptr. 3d at 133, 135-36 (supervisor of

forensic alcohol analysis and drug section of state crime could not
offer

expert

testimony on reliability of HGN

test because

of

widespread disagreement within the scientific community).
Furthermore, the studies and cases standing alone are insufficient
to allow the court to take judicial notice.
at 1236

See Philips, 615 P. 2d

(articles submitted by proponent of paternity test not

sufficient, in absence of expert testimony, to determine as matter
of law that paternity test has achieved general acceptance

in

scientific community) ; Rimmasch, 775 P. 2d at 3 98 ("very high level
of reliability is required before judicial notice can be taken.");
State v. Reed, 83 Or. App. 451, 732 P.2d 66, 69 (Or. App. 1987)
(error

for

trial

court

to

take

judicial

notice

of

HGN

test

reliability in absence of expert testimony).
The

only

evidence

presented

to

establish

the

inherent

reliability of the HGN would have to come from arresting officer
Mortensen who lacks the specialized scientific training to testify
about the test's scientific reliability.

See Williams, 5 Cal Rptr.

at 134 (arresting officer not qualified to give expert opinion that
suspect's nystagmus was caused by alcohol consumption); State v.
Barker, 366 S.E.2d 642, 645 (W. Va. 1988) (error to admit HGN when
only testimony was from arresting officer whose testimony consisted
of defining HGN and explaining how he conducted test); State v.
17

Borchardt, 395 N.W.2d 551, 559 (Neb. 1986) (arresting officer, who
received training through police-sponsored seminar, not qualified
to testify

as expert witness

to verify

reliability

of

test);

Commonwealth v. Miller, 367 Pa. Super. 359, 532 A.2d 1186, 1189-90
(testimony from officer who participated in two day HGN training
course insufficient to establish foundation for test's admission);
Middleton v. State, 780 S.W.2d 581 (Ark. App. 1989) (testimony of
arresting officer alone unable to establish reliability and general
acceptance of HGN); State v. Reed, 83 Or. App. 451, 732 P.2d 66, 69
(Or. App. 1987) (Officer who had received in-service training for
HGN and conducted test over 100 times in field not qualified as
expert to testify regarding reliability of HGN test).
Mortensen did not testify that he possessed special scientific
training

in neuro-physiology

familiar with neurological

or

ophthalmology

malfunction

of

(medical

smooth eye

fields

tracking

patterns caused by alcohol or other neurological causes which may
result in nystagmus); pharmacology and toxicology (medical fields
familiar with the physical, emotional, and physiological effect of
alcohol and drugs); or behavioral psychology (effects of alcohol on
the movement of the eye) . See e.g. , Miller, 532 A. 2d at 1189-90
(non-scientific police training insufficient to qualify officer as
scientific expert).
The California

Court of Appeals explained

the problem of

allowing police officers with no scientific expertise to state
their opinion regarding the relationship between alcohol ingestion
and HGN:
18

[HGN] rests on scientific premises well beyond [the
officer's] knowledge, training, or education. Without some
understanding of the processes by which alcohol ingestion
produces nystagmus, how strong the correlation is, how other
possible causes might be masked, what margin of error has been
shown in statistical surveys, and a host of other relevant
factors, his opinion on causation, notwithstanding his ability
to recognize the symptom, was unfounded.
Williams, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 13 5.
In sum, police officers lack the scientific

training and

expertise necessary to validate the scientific principles upon
which the HGN is premised.

Although a police officer may testify

as to his observations, those observations do not validate the
underlying scientific principle.

Hearsay statements learned in

police school regarding the HGN's reliability are unquestionably
insufficient to establish the scientific foundation mandated by
Philips.

Accordingly, the State must produce expert testimony,

other than line officers, to establish the inherent reliability of
the HGN test. See Philips, 615 P.2d at 1236 (laboratory technician
who completed basic workup on paternity blood tests not qualified
to testify with respect to scientific validity of test).

C.

(1)

THE HGN TEST IS NOT INHERENTLY RELIABLE

The Correctness of The Principles Underlying The Test
In State v. Witte, 836 P. 2d at 1121, the Kansas Supreme Court

found that

n

[t]he reliability of the HGN test is not currently a

settled proposition in the scientific community."
that

HGN

did

admissibility

not
of

meet

the

scientific

foundational

evidence.
19

id.

It concluded

requirements
at

1119.

for
More

importantly,

the court reviewed a number of recent

scientific

articles that question the scientific reliability of the HGN test8
and

which

recognize

division

within

the

scientific

regarding the reliability of the HGN test.
Rptr.

at

133

(relevant

scientific

community

See Williams, 5 Cal.

community

"disagree

on

the

accuracy and reliability of the HGN test for identifying alcohol
impairment.").

(2) Accuracy and Reliability of Methods Utilized in Applying HGN
Officer Mortensen relied on information learned in D.R.E.
school, which looks to the NHTSA in determining the degree of angle
when the onset of nystagmus will be evident. NHTSA identifies a 45
degree

angle

of

lateral

estimating a BAC of .10.
concedes

that

officers

deviation

as

the

1984 NHTSA Study at 3-4.
using

the

45

degree

incorrectly estimate BAC 22% of the time.
30.

crucial

angle

point

for

Even NHTSA
of

onset

1981 NHTSA Study at 25-

One other study concludes that as many as 50% to 60% of sober

individuals who deviate their eyes more than 40 degrees to the side
will exhibit a form of nystagmus indistinguishable from alcohol
nystagmus.

Pangman,

Electronystagmography:

supra

Technical

8

at
Aspects

2
and

(citing

Toglia,

Atlas

(1976)).

Those articles include Cowan & Jaffe, Proof and Disproof of
Alcohol-Induced Driving Impairment Throucrh Evidence of Observable
Intoxication and Coordination Testing, 9 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d
459 §12 (1990);
Pangman, Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus: Voodoo
Science, 2 DWI Journal 1, 3-4 (1987); Rouleau, Unreliability of
Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test, 4 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 43 9 §
7, p. 452 (1989); 1 Erwin, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases §§ 8A:06,
8A:08 (3d ed. 1992); 2 Nichols, Drinking/ Driving Litigation §
26:01 (1991 & Supp. 1992).
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Another study contradicts the NHTSA findings and instead concludes
that

a lateral

deviation of 40% correlates

Pangman, supra at 2

to a BAC of

.06.

(citing Aschan, Different Types of Alcohol

Nystagmus, Acta Otolaryngologica Supp. 14 0:69

(1957) and Aschan,

Bergstedt, Goldberg & Laurell, Positional Nystagmus in Man During
and After Alcohol Intoxication, 17 Q.J. of Studies on Alcohol 381
(1956)).

Still another study concludes that individuals with a

purported BAC of .10 do not exhibit nystagmus until the eye is
deviated to a 51 degree angle.

Pangman, supra at 2 (citing Lehti,

The Effect of Blood Alcohol Concentration on the Onset of Gaze
Nystagmus, 13 Blutalkohol 411

(1976)).

Mortensen was aware of

disagreement in the scientific community about the accuracy of the
45 degree angle of onset.

T. Tr. 101.

At least one law enforcement agency concluded that "there was
virtually no correlation between the actual value of blood alcohol
concentration and the predicted value based upon the angle of onset
of

nystagmus."

Rouleau,

supra

at

453

(citing

Norris,

The

Correlation of Angle of Onset of Nystagmus With Blood Alcohol
Level: Report of a Field Trial, 25

(No. 6) Journal of Forensic

Science Society 476 (1985). Although the study found a correlation
between the breath alcohol reading and angle of onset of nystagmus,
the author concluded that the BAC prediction was influenced by the
officer's prior knowledge of the subject's breath test result. The
testing officers were incorrect approximately 50% of the time when
blood

was

taken because

BAC results were not

administering the HGN test.

known prior

to

Simply put, the testing officers were
21

able to manipulate the HGN results when they knew an actual BAC
from the breath testing, but could not come close to the correct
BAC prior to learning the results of the blood test.

Rouleau,

supra at 453.
(3)

Effect of Variables that Influence Accuracy of Test

Mortensen admitted that several variables affect the accuracy
of the test.

He was aware that diseases, including the measles,

cause nystagmus, as well as epilepsy, head injury, syphilis and eye
strain can all cause nystagmus. T. Tr. 99-100.

He did not testify

how he was able to distinguish alcohol nystagmus from other forms
of nystagmus or if he was able to make that distinction at all.
Recent scientific studies expand the list of factors that may
cause

nystagmus:

irrigating

inner

ear

labyrinth;

2.

ears with warm or cold water;

3.

influenza;

4.

7. syphilis;

8.

streptococcus;

1.

problems with

5. vertigo;

arteriosclerosis;

strain;

15. motion sickness;

conditions,

pressure,

Pangman,

id.

at

455;

antihistamines, id. at 455; and
also

13. epilepsy;

16, sunstroke;

19. glaucoma;
supra

Rouleau, supra at 456;

caffeine,

10. multiple sclerosis;

12. brain hemorrhage;

18. eye muscle fatigue;

atmospheric

23.

measles;

9. muscular dystrophy;

11. Korsakoff's syndrome;
14. hypertension;

6.

at

3;

20. changes in
21.

22. nicotine,

24. Aspirin,

id.

poor

light

id. at 455;

at

455;

26. circadian rhythms.

Williams, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 136

17. eye

Id.

25.
See

(State's forensic alcohol

expert "readily admitted that many other factors can be responsible
[for HGN] and could lead to a 'false positive'11).
22

Mortensen was

either unaware of these scientific articles, was unqualified to
interpret the scientific literature, or was simply disingenuous
about the existence of other causes of HGN.

(4)
Establishing that the Test Performed in this Case was
Performed in Accordance with Proper Procedures and with Proper
Materials and Equipment.
Mortensen acknowledged that the angle of lateral deviation
must be estimated.

T. Tr. 81.

Failure to properly estimate the

angle present [s] a problem with the accuracy and consistency of the
HGN result.

Because determination of the angle of onset is such a

sensitive measurement, the NHTSA in its HGN studies and others
conducting HGN research use a mechanical device to anchor the head
in a stable position. 1981 NHTSA Study at 6, 16; see Lehti, supra,
13

Blutalkohol

411,

Aschan,

supra

Supp.

140:69.

Angular

measurements were then obtained through the use of protractors to
precisely measure the angle of onset.
In

contrast

to

laboratory

1981 NHTSA Study at 16.

procedures,

a

roadside

test

administered by a police officer has no mechanical device to ensure
that the suspect's head does not move.

The field officer simply

instructs the suspect to "Keep your head still."9
at 3.

1984 NHTSA Study

It is difficult to conceive that even a sober person could

maintain his head in a perfectly fixed position without the use of
a

mechanical

device.

Maintaining

a

fixed

position

becomes

increasingly unlikely when the suspect is nervous, T. Tr. at 76,
9

NHTSA also instructs the officer to use a flashlight or his
free hand for a chin rest if the suspect moves his head.
1984
NHTSA Study at 3.
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and was visually and vocally distracted by State Street traffic and
people who were yelling and screaming.

T. Tr. 151.

Additionally,

police officers in the field are unlikely to perceive subtle head
movements which may affect the accuracy of the test since even
subtle head movement will render the results of the HGN test
invalid for determining the suspect's level of intoxication.

D.
THE ADMISSION OF THE HGN RESULTS STATEMENTS WAS PREJUDICIAL
ERROR REQUIRING REVERSAL.
"In order to constitute reversible error, the error complained
of must be sufficiently prejudicial that there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant in its
absence."

State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 431

(Utah 1989);

State v. Cox, 787 P.2d 4, 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
In the instant case, no breath test evidence was available at
trial.

Mr. Strausburg's vehicle was not weaving or swerving.

The

driving conditions were treacherous.

It was raining and "very

slick".

Sergeant Mohler commented

T. Tr. 61, 19, 57, 132, 170.

that he would not drive that intersection if it were wet because it
was so dangerous.

T. Tr. 61.

Not only that, but Mr. Strausburg

was trying to negotiate a left-hand turn coming off of a hill in an
eighteen wheel

truck.

T. Tr. 20, 57, 133.

Sergeant

Mohler

attributed the accident to the trailer of the truck jackknifing
"because it's going downhill and it's wet, and the trailer will
slide out behind him."

Mohler responded "yes" when asked if he

felt the accident happened because the "brakes were applied and the
road was slick."

T. Tr. 59
24

The driving pattern here was not necessarily consistent with an
intoxicated driver, but poor road conditions in a vehicle that
requires precision and skill to operate. Much more is needed to
establish that the driving pattern is the result of intoxication.
See State v. Borchardt, 395 N.W. 2d 551 (Neb 1986)

(dangerous and

erratic driving almost causing accident, inadequate performance on
Field Sobriety Tests, admission to drinking, slurred speech, and
Prosecutors's statement in opening that Defendant's BAC was .18
make admission of HGN harmless error); Commonwealth v. Miller, 532
A. 2d 1186, 1190 (Pa. Super. 1987) (Admission of HGN harmless error
in light of other evidence showing that Defendant was involved in
accident, drove away from police at excessive speed, went through
stop sign, drove over curb, fought with police, failed all field
sobriety tests, had slurred speech, and odor of alcohol).
Mr. Strausburg and his passenger both testified that they did
not feel the impact of the accident.

T. Tr. 134, 170.

Strausburg

stated that he "definitely" would have stopped if he had known he
were in an accident.

T. Tr. 170. Defense witness Walter L. Aires,

who has driven trucks similar to the one driven by Strausburg for
40-45 years, testified that it was very possible to be in the kind
of accident Strausburg was involved in without even being aware of
it.

T. Tr. 152.

In those weather conditions with that size of

vehicle, Aires said it would be very possible to not feel the
impact of the accident.

T. Tr. 152-153.

He mentioned a time when

he was in a serious accident without being aware of it. Id.
The first officer at the scene, David Richards, testified to
25

an odor of alcohol coming from the cab of the truck (T. Tr. 42) ,
however on cross examination, Richards admitted that degree of
intoxication could not be determined from odor of alcohol.
44.

T. Tr.

Sergeant Mohler, who elicited damaging statements from the

defendant, did not mention any odor of alcohol coming from the
truck, Strausburg or the passenger.

And he never mentioned that

they appeared intoxicated.
It is hard to believe that the third officer, Mortensen,
suddenly noticed an odor of alcohol which Mohler could not detect
while talking to Strausburg just moments earlier.

T. Tr. 72. His

speech was only "slightly" slurred" and "he was understandable".
Id,

Even though Strausburg admitted to having four beers in the

last hour and a half (T. Tr. 87), Trooper Zdunich testified that
Strausburg's BAC would be only a .027 using the Widmark formula.
T. Tr. 118.
Finally, Mr. Strausburg's performance

on the other

field

sobriety tests was graded subjectively and is just as consistent
with someone who was not intoxicated.

People are nervous when

asked to perform field sobriety tests, especially when immediately
prior to taking the tests, one has been told that he or she has
caused an accident in which people were injured and taken to the
hospital as occurred here. T. Tr. 56.
Actually, Strausburg performed very well on all of the field
sobriety tests.

On the "finger-count" test, Mortensen stated that

Strausburg never missed a finger or miscounted.
that

he has

seen

subjects

do a lot worse
26

He also stated

on this

test

than

Strausburg.

T. Tr. 94.

The only reason for failing Strausburg on

this test was that he did not touch his fingers exactly tip-to-tip
and he performed the test one more time than asked.

T. Tr. 75-76.

On the "one-legged stand" test, Strausburg never lifted his
hands for balance.

Mortensen said he failed Strausburg on this

test for putting his foot down once. However, Strausburg restarted
the test and performed it perfectly.

T. Tr. 77. Also, the officer

knew that Strausburg had a bad back and that a bad back can affect
performance on this test.

T. Tr. 95.

Again, Mortensen admitted

that he has seen people do this test a lot worse than Strausburg
did.

T. Tr. 95.
On the "walk-and-turn" test, Strausburg performed this test

perfectly.

He walked up seven steps heel-to-toe and returned nine

steps in the same manner.
balancing.

Mortensen felt that he had "a hard time

Other than that I didn't notice any other signs."

T.

Tr. 78.
Strausburg did well on the "alphabet test" as well.

He was

asked to say the alphabet twice, starting with 'B' and ending with
'S'.

This test was performed perfectly except that on the second

time through, he started with the letter 'A' rather than ' B'.

T.

Tr. 82.
The officer also mentioned that these field sobriety tests do
not necessarily indicate degree of impairment.

He has witnessed

persons with very high BAC levels, yet they perform well on the
field sobriety tests.

And, he has seen subjects with very low BAC

levels who perform very poorly on these field sobriety tests. T.
27

Tr. 104, 110.
Because Strausburg performed so well on the field sobriety
tests and because the tests' unreliability in predicting degree of
intoxication, it is likely that the jury gave a lot of weight to
the HGN test and determined that he was intoxicated based on this
test alone.

The court's admission of the HGN test was therefore

not harmless error, and Mr. Strausburg should be granted a new
trial.
Strausburg stated that he did not feel the effects of the
alcohol

and did not

feel that he was under the

alcohol. T. Tr. 179.

influence of

In the absence of the HGN, there is a

reasonable likelihood the jury would have acquitted Mr. Strausburg.
See Witte, 836 P.2d at 1121 (admission of HGN reversible error by
leading jury to believe that result supported Intoxilyzer reading);
Ex Parte Malone, 575 So. 2d at 107

("The

problem

created

by

improper admission of the HGN evidence is due to the scientific
nature of the test and the disproportionate impact it might have
had on the jury's decision-making process.").

Indeed the admission

of HGN here is the kind of evidence likely "to distort the factfinding process by reason of its superficial plausibility and its
potential for inducing fact finders to accept experts' judgments on
critical issues rather than making their own."
399.

Rimmasch, 775 P.2d

The critical issue is whether Mr. Strausburg was impaired and

unable to safely operate his vehicle because he was under the
influence

of

alcohol.

If

the

jury

considered

the

remaining

evidence, absent the HGN, it is likely that the jury would have
28

reached

* different result.

See Witte, 83£ P ?d at

.1.

II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS
WITHOUT GIVING PROPER MIRANDA WARNINGS AND FAILURE TO GIVE THESE
WARNINGS WAS NOT HARMLESS ERROR,
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49-52.

He observed transfer paint on the right side of the trailer

of the truck which was consistent with damage that would have
occurred in the Van Winkle accident.

T. Tr. 50. The nature of the

conversation he had with Mr. Strausburg was " [t]o ascertain whether
or not he was involved
Winkle."

in this accident on 9th East and Van

T. Tr. 55.

In response to this inquiry, Strausburg incriminated himself
by making the comment that he was not at the scene of the accident,
but

rather

he

was

on Wasatch

Boulevard.

Id.

After

further

interrogation, Strausburg admitted to being at the scene of the
accident when it occurred. T. Tr. 56.

Because Strausburg was

charged

INJURY

with

LEAVING

THE

statements were damaging.

SCENE

OF AN

ACCIDENT,

these

They suggest that Strausburg lied about

being at the scene because he knew he caused the accident but
decided to leave anyway.

This information was crucial to the

state's case as it establishes an element of the crime of LEAVING
THE SCENE OF AN INJURY ACCIDENT.
B.

CUSTODY
Not only must a person be subject to interrogation by the

police, but he or she must also be in police custody before Miranda
warnings are triggered.

The person need not be formally arrested,

but his or her freedom of movement must be restricted to the degree
of a formal arrest.
App.1991).

The

State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 1104 (Utah

standard

is

an

objective

one,

or

whether

a

reasonable person in the same circumstances would not feel free to
leave. Id.
30
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quoting People
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Mohler informed otiausburg of the seriousness of the accident and

stating that people were injured and in the hospital.

T. Tr. 56.

Under these conditions, a reasonable person would not feel free to
disregard the officer's questions and leave.
As to factor four, the form of the questioning has been an
important consideration.

When investigatory questioning turns to

accusatory questioning, custody is likely and Miranda warnings
become essential.

Carner at 1170. Questioning becomes accusatory

when the police reasonably believe a crime has been committed and
that the defendant committed it. Id. at 1171.
Even before approaching the cab of the truck, Mohler had
reason to believe that the occupant committed a crime.

The truck

matched the description of the vehicle given at the accident scene
and when Mohler first arrived, he examined the truck and noticed
transfer paint on the trailer of the truck.

T. Tr. 50.

As

Strausburg was the prime suspect for the Van Winkle accident, the
police should have given Miranda warnings before questioning him.
Lastly, as to factor five, Mr. Strausburg did not come to the
place of questioning willingly, but rather the officer approached
him for questioning.
Strausburg

that

he

Mohler did not testify that he informed
was

free

to

leave

without

answering

his

questions.
Strausburg incriminated himself by stating that he was not at
the scene of the accident, but rather that he was on Wasatch
Boulevard.

T. Tr. 55.

After further interrogation, Strausburg

admitted to being at the scene of the accident when it occurred. T.
Tr. 56.

Because Strausburg was charged with LEAVING THE SCENE OF
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ADDENDUM A

tion — Color of light signal — Inoperative traffic-control signals.
D (a) Green, red, and yellow are the only colors
that may be used in traffic-control signals, except
for special pedestrian signals that may use white
and orange.
(b) Traffic-control signals indicate and apply
to operators of vehicles and pedestrians as provided in this section.
2) (a* (i) Except as provided in Subsection fiii vehicular traffic facing a circular green signal
may:
(A) proceed straight through t h e intersection;
(B) turn right; or
(C) turn left.
(ii) Vehicular traffic facing a circular
- r e e n signal, including vehicles turning
ight or left:
(A) shall yield t h e right-of-way to
other vehicles a n d to pedestrians lawfully w i t h i n t h e intersection or a n adjacent crosswalk a t the time the signal is
exhibited; a n d
(B) m a y not turn right or left if a sign
at t h e intersection prohibits t h e turn
(b) Vehicular traffic facing a green arrow signal shown alone or in combination with other
indication:
(i) m a y cautiously enter t h e intersection
only to m a k e the m o v e m e n t indicated by the
arrow or other indication shown a t the same
time; a n d
(ii) shall yield t h e right-of-way to pedestrians lawfully within an adjacent crosswalk
and to other traffic lawfully using the intersection.
(c) U n l e s s otherwise directed by a pedestriancontrol signal under Section 41-6-25, pedestrians
facing any green signal other than a green turn
arrow m a y proceed across t h e roadway within
any marked or u n m a r k e d crosswalk.
(3) (a) Vehicular traffic facing a steady circular
yellow or yellow arrow signal i s warned that th^
allowable m o v e m e n t related to a green signal i#
b e i n g terminated.
(b) U n l e s s otherwise directed by a pedestriancontrol signal under Section 41-6-25, pedestrians
facing a steady circular yellow or yeUow arrow
signal are advised t h a t there i s insufficient time
to cross t h e roadway before a red indication is
shown, and a pedestrian may not start to cross
the roadway.
(4) (a) Except a s provided in Subsection (4)(c), vehicular traffic facing a steady circular red or red
arrow signal:
(i) may n o t enter t h e intersection unless
entering t h e intersection to m a k e a movement permitted b y another indication; and
(ii) shall stop a t a clearly marked stop
line, but if none, before entering the marked
or unmarked crosswalk on t h e near side of
the intersection and shall remain stopped
until a n indication to proceed is shown.
(b) U n l e s s otherwise directed b y a pedestriancontrol signal under Section 41-6-25, pedestrians
facing a steady red signal alone m a y not enter
the roadway.
(c) (i) Except w h e n a sign is in place prohibiti n g a turn, vehicular traffic facing a n y

from a one-way street into a one-way street,
after stopping a s required by Subsection
(4KB).

(ii) The vehicular traffic shall yield the
right-of-way to pedestrians lawfully within
an adjacent crosswalk and to other traffic
lawfully using t h e intersection.
(5) (a) This section applies where a n official traf*
fic-control signal i s erected and maintained at an
intersection or a t a place other t h a n a n intersex
tion.
(b) Any stop required shall be m a d e a t a sign
or marking on t h e h i g h w a y p a v e m e n t indicating
where the stop shall be made, but, i n the absent*
of any sign or marking, t h e stop shall be made i t
the signal
(6) The operator of a vehicle approaching an intersection that h a s an official traffic-control
signal that
is inoperative shall stop before entering the intersection and shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle as
required under Section 41-6-72.
1MI
41-6-25. Special pedestrian-control signals —
Meaning of signals — Rights and do*
ties.
When special pedestrian-control signals exhibiting
the words "Walk" or "Don't Walk" or symbols of
"Walking Person" or "Upraised Palm" are in plact,
the signals indicate:
(a) Flashing or steady "Walk" or symbol of
"Walking Person" m e a n s a pedestrian facing tht
signal may proceed across t h e roadway in tht
direction of the signal and the operators of ill
vehicles shall yield t h e right-of-way to him. ,(
(b) Flashing or steady "Don't Walk" e f
"Upraised Palm" m e a n s a pedestrian may not
start to cross the roadway in the direction of tht
signal, but a pedestrian who h a s partially eoim
pleted his crossing on the walk signal shall pro^
ceed to a sidewalk or safety island while tht
"Don't Walk" or "Upraised Palm" signal is shofs,
ing
1M?
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Flashing red or yellow signals — Right!
and duties of operators — Railroad
grade crossings excluded.
I
(1) When an illuminated flashing red or yellow aif*
- a l i s used in a traffic signal or with a traffic alga,
ehicular traffic shall obey it a s follows(a) Flashing red stop signal* When a red signal:
is illuminated by rapid intermittent flashes, ot>j
erators of vehicles shall stop at a clearly marM
stop line, but if none, before entering the croaK
walk on the nearest side of the intersection, or If
none, then at a point nearest the intersedJaf *
roadway where the operator has a view of taw
proaching traffic on the intersecting roadway bt*
fore entering The right to proceed is subject It
the rules applicable after making a stop at a attp
sign
'
(b) Flashing yellow caution signal: When I 1
yellow signal is illuminated with rapid intermit^
t e n t flashes, operators of vehicles may procmi,
through the intersection or past the signal otfy
with caution
(2) This section does n o t apply at railroad f r t t V
crossings. Provisions regarding vehicles approachJaii
railroad grade crossings are under Section 41-6-95;

vidual lanes, t h e s i g n a l s indicate and apply to operators of vehicles a s follows:
(1) Green signal — vehicular traffic may
travel in any lane over which a green signal is
shown.
(2) Steady yellow signal — vehicular traffic i s
warned that a l a n e control change i s being made.
(3) Steady red signal — vehicular traffic may
not enter or travel i n a n y l a n e over which a red
signal is shown
(4) Flashing yellow signal — vehicular traffic
may use the lane only for the purpose of approaching and making a left turn
twi
41-6-27.

Prohibition of unauthorized signs, signals, lights or markings — Commercial
advertising — Public nuisance — Re
moval.
(1) A person m a y n o t place, m a i n t a i n , or display
upon or in view of any h i g h w a y a n y unauthorized
lign, signal, light, marking, or device which purports
to be or i s a n imitation of or resembles a n official
traffic-control device or railroad sign or signal, or authorized emergency vehicle flashing light, or which
(a) attempts to direct the m o v e m e n t of traffic,
(b) hides from v i e w or interferes w i t h the effectiveness of a n y official traffic-control device or
any railroad sign or signal; or
(c) which i s of such brilliant illumination and
so positioned a s to blind or dazzle a n operator o r
any adjacent h i g h w a y .
(2) A person m a y n o t place or m a i n t a i n nor ma%
any public authority permit upon any h i g h w a y any
traffic sign or signal bearing o n it a n y commercial
advertising except for business s i g n s included a s part
of official motorist service panels approved by the Department of Transportation. T h i s provision does not
prohibit the erection upon private property adjacent
to highways of s i g n s g i v i n g useful directional information and of a type that m a y not be m i s t a k e n f c
official signs
(3) Every prohibited sign, signal, or light, or mark
ing is declared to be a public nuisance and the authority having jurisdiction over the highways ma%
remove it or cause it to be removed without notice
41-6-28. Interference with signs and signals
prohibited.
A person may not without lawful authority attempt
to or in fact alter, deface, injure, knock down, or remove any official traffic-control device or any railroad
•ign or signal or any inscription, shield, or insignia
On it, or any other part of it
iw?
ARTICLE 4
ACCIDENTS
414-29. Operator's duty at accident — Stop at
accident — Penalty.
(1) The operator of a vehicle involved in an accieVnt resulting in injury to or death of any person
•hall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the
accident or as close to it as possible and shall immediately return to and remain at the scene of the acciitnt until he has fulfilled the requirements of Section
41*6-31. The stop may not obstruct traffic more than
k necessary.

misdemeanor.

u

41-6-30. Accidents involving damage to vehlc
or property — Stop at accident.
The operator of a vehicle involved in an accide
resulting only in damage to a vehicle or other pro
erty which is operated or attended by any perso
shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of tl
accident or as close to it as possible, and shall imm
diately return to and remain at the scene of the ac«
dent until he has fulfilled the requirements of Sectii
41-6-31. The stop may not obstruct traffic more thi
is necessary
it
41-6-31.

Accident involving Injury, death, <
property damage — Duties of operate
occupant, owner.
CI) The operator of a vehicle involved in an ac<
dent resulting in injury to or death of any person
damage to any vehicle or other property, if the vel
cle or other property is operated, occupied, or t
tended by any person or if the owner of the vehicle
property is present, shall:
(a) give to the person*? involved his name, a
dress, and the registration number of the vehi<
he is operating;
(b) upon request and if available, exhibit 1
operator's license to
(i) any investigating peace officer presei
(ii) t h e person struck;
(iii) t h e operator, occupant of, or pers
attending the vehicle or other property dai
aged in t h e accident; a n d
(iv) the owner of property damaged in t
accident, if present; and
(c) render to any person injured in the collisi
reasonable assistance, including t h e transpo
ing, or the m a k i n g of arrangements for the trai
porting, of the person to a physician, surgeon,
hospital for medical or surgical treatment if it
apparent that treatment is necessary or if t
transporting is requested by the injured perse
(2) The operator of a vehicle involved in an ac
dent resulting in injury to or death of any person
property d a m a g e to a n apparent extent of $750
more shall immediately and by the quickest means
communication available give not if e of the accide
to t h e nearest office of a l a w enforcement agenc
(3) If the operator of a vehicle is physically incai
ble of giving a n immediate notice of a n accident
required in Subsections (1) and (2) and there is t
other occupant in the vehicle at the time of the ac
dent capable of giving an immediate notice, *b* . »•<
pant shall give or cause to be given t h e n.
quired of the operator under this section.
(4) If the operator is physically incapable of m*
ing a written report of an accident when requii
under Section 41-6-35 and he is not the owner of t
vehicle, then the owner of the vehicle involved in t
accident shall within 15 d**ys after becoming awarr
the accident make the report required of the opera
under this section.
I
41-6-32. Collision with unattended vehicle
other property — Duties of operati
The operator of a vehicle which collides with or
involved in an accident with any vehicle or otl
property which is unattended and which results
damage to the other vehicle or property shall imme
ately stop and either locate and notify the operator
owner of the vehicle or th*» nwnor nf ntV»m- nconoH*

IYIWIV^IV
cal control of a motor vehicle while having alcohol in
the blood or while under the influence of alcohol or
any drug or the combined influence of alcohol and
any drug, or that governs, in relation to any of those
matters, the use of a chemical test or chemical tests,
or evidentiary presumptions, or penalties, or that
governs any combination of those matters, shall be
consistent with the provisions in this code which govern those matters.
(2) An ordinance adopted by a local authority that
governs reckless driving, or operating a vehicle in
willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons
or property shall be consistent with the provisions of
this code which govern those matters.
1987
41-6-43.10.
41-6-44.

Repealed.

1985

Driving u n d e r the influence of alcohol,
drugs, or with specified or unsafe
blood alcohol concentration — Measurement of blood or breath alcohol —
Criminal punishment — Arrest without warrant — Penalties — S u s p e n s i o n
or revocation of license — Penalties.
(1) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual
physical control of a vehicle within this state if
the person:
(i) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater as shown by a
chemical test given within two hours after
the alleged operation or physical control; or
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any
drug, or the combined influence of alcohol
and any drug to a degree that renders the
person incapable of safely operating a vehicle,
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has been legally entitled to
use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any
charge of violating this section
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be
based upon grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of
blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall
be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of
breath.
(3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time
of a violation of Subsection (1) is guilty of a:
(i) class B misdemeanor; or
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person:
(A) has also inflicted bodily injury
upon another as a proximate result of
having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner; or
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of
age in the vehicle at the time of the offense.
(b) In this section, the standard of negligence
is that of simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of care that an ordinarily reasonable and prudent person exercises under like or
similar circumstances.
(c) In this section, a reference to this section
includes any similar local ordinance adopted in
compliance with Section 41-6-43
(4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court
shall, upon a first conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 consecutive
hours nor more than 240 hours.
(b) The court may, as an alternative to jail,
SA
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(c) (i) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work program, the court
shall order the person to participate in an
assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility, as appropriate.
(ii) For a violation committed after July I,
1993, the court may order the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility if the licensed
alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility determines that the person has a problem condition involving alcohol or drugs.
(5) (a) Upon a second conviction for a violation
committed within six years of a prior violation
under this section the court shall as part of any
sentence impose a mandatory jail sentence of not
less than 240 consecutive hours nor more than
720 hours.
(b) The court may, as an alternative to jail,
require the person to work in a community-service work program for not less than 80 hours nor
more than 240 hours.
(c) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work program, the court shall order
the person to participate in an assessment and
educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug
dependency rehabilitation facility, as appropriate. The court may, in its discretion, order the
person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drag
dependency rehabilitation facility.
(6) (a) A third conviction for a violation committed
within six years of two prior violations under tail
section is a:
(i) class B misdemeanor except as provided in Subsections (ii) and (7); and b ;
(ii) class A misdemeanor if both of tat
prior convictions are for violations commit- \
ted after April 23, 1990.
*.
(b) (i) Under Subsection (a)(i) the court shall
as part of any sentence impose a mandatory ,
jail sentence of not less than 720 nor mora
than 2,160 hours.
(ii) The court may, as an alternative it
jail, require the person to work in a commanity-service work program for not less thai,
240 nor more than 720 hours
11
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or eon- j
munity-service work program, the court r
shall order the person to obtain treatment t t '
an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation \
facility, as appropriate.
#^
(c) (i) Under Subsection (a)(ii) the court shall '
as part of any sentence impose a fine of not •
less than $1,000 and impose a mandatory j t l '
sentence of not less than 720 hours nor mora *
than 2,160 hours.
v*|
(ii) The court may, as an alternative If
jail, require the person to work in a commo> ;
nity-service work program for not less thtfj
240 nor more than 720 hours, but only If tat
court enters in writing on the record the rot* j
son it finds the defendant should not sen*"
the jail sentence Enrollment in and completion of an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation program approved by the court
may be a sentencing alternative to incarceration or community service if the Droffrul ii
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(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work program, the court
shall order the person to obtain treatment at
•
an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation
facility.
(7) (a) A fourth or subsequent conviction for a vio, lation committed within six years of the prior
, violations under this section is a third degree feli ony if at least three prior convictions are for vio, lations committed after April 23, 1990.
,
(b) The court shall as part of any sentence impose a fine of not less than $1,000 and impose a
, mandatory jail sentence of not less than 720
hours nor more than 2,160 hours.
(c) (i) The court may, as an alternative to jail,
i%
I
require the person to work in a communityservice work program for not less than 240
nor more than 720 hours, but only if the
court enters in writing on the record the reason it finds the defendant should not serve
t
the jail sentence.
(ii) Enrollment in and completion of an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation program approved by the court may be a sen1
tencing alternative to incarceration or community service if the program provides in1
tensive care or inpatient treatment and long'
term closely supervised follow through after
*
the treatment.
r
' (d) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work program, the court shall order
f
, the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or
h
drug dependency rehabilitation facility.
1
(8) (a) The mandatory portion of any sentence re•? quired under this section may not be suspended
t and the convicted person is not eligible for parole
or probation until any sentence imposed under
& this section has been served. Probation or parole
* resulting from a conviction for a violation under
\< this section may not be terminated
'*) (b) The department may not reinstate any Iip cense suspended or revoked as a result of the conl
f, viction under this section, until the convicted
+ person has furnished evidence satisfactory to the
t department that:
(i) all required alcohol or drug dependency
fc
f/

^(
^
/
L
i
L
^
k
f!
r
*!
1

assessment, education, treatment, and rehabilitation ordered for a violation committed
after July 1, 1993, have been completed;
(ii) all fines and fees including fees for restitution and rehabilitation costs assessed
against the person have been paid, if the conviction is a second or subsequent conviction
for a violation committed within six years of
a prior violation; and
(iii) the person does not use drugs in any
abusive or illegal manner as certified by a
licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility, if the conviction is for a third

or subsequent conviction for a violation cornmitted within six years of two prior violations committed after July 1, 1993
f(9) (a) (i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5),
j*
(6), and (7) that require a sentencing court to
I
order a convicted person to* participate in an
assessment and educational series at a lilt
censed alcohol or drug dependency rehabili1
tation facility; obtain, in the discretion of the
#»
court •*»•*••"«•* -*• — •
el
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combination of those things, apply to a cc
viction for a violation of Section 41-6-45 th
qualifies as a prior conviction under Subsc
tion (10).
(ii) The court shall render the same ord
regarding education or treatment at an ale
hoi or drug dependency rehabilitation faci
ity, or both, in connection with a first, se
ond, or subsequent conviction under Sectio
41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior convictio
under Subsection (10), aB the court woul
render in connection with applying respet
tively, the first, second, or subsequent cor
viction requirements of Subsections (4), (5
(6), and (7).
(b) For purposes of determining whether a con
viction under Section 41-6-45 that qualified as i
prior conviction under Subsection (10), is a first
second, or subsequent conviction under this sub
section, a previous conviction under either this
section or Section 41-6-45 is considered a prioi
conviction.
(c) Any alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation program and any community-based or other
education program provided for in this section
shall be approved by the Department of Human
Services.
(10) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea
of guilty or no contest to a charge of a violation of Section 41-6-45 or of an ordinance enacted under Section 41-6-43 in satisfaction
of, or as a substitute for, an original charge
of a violation of this section, the prosecution
shall state for the record a factual basis for
the plea, including whether or not there had
been consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant in connection with the violation.
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of
the facts that shows whether there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination
of both, by the defendant, in connection with
the violation.
(b) (i) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea offered under this
subsection of the consequences of a violation
of Section 41-6-45 as follows.
(ii) If the court accepts the defendant's
plea of guilty or no contest to a charge of
violating Section 41-6-45, and the prosecutor
states for the record that there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of
both, by the defendant in connection with
the violation, the resulting conviction is a
prior conviction for the purposes of Subsections (5), (6), and (7).
(c) The court shall notify the department of
each conviction of Section 41-6-45 that is a prior
offense for the purposes of Subsections (5), (6),
and (7).
( I D A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest
a person for a violation of this section when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has
occurred, although not in his presence, and if the officer has probable cause to believe that the violation
was committed by the person
(12) (a) The Department of Public Safety shall*

date of the prior violation
(b) The department shall subtract from any
suspension or revocation period the number of
days for which a license was previously suspended under Section 53-3-223, if the previous
suspension was based on the same occurrence
upon which the record of conviction is based. I»M
41-6-44,1, Procedures —- Adjudicative proceedings.
The Department of Public Safety shal
with
the procedures and requirements of TitI
apter
46b, in its adjudicative proceedings
imi
41-6-44.2. Repealed.

less

41-6-44.3. Standards for chemical breath analysis — Evidence.
(1) The commissioner of the Department of Public
Safety shall establish standards for the administration and interpretation of chemical analysis of a person's breath, including standards of training
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to prove that a person was operating or in actual
physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or operating with a blood
or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited, documents offered as memoranda or records of acts, conditions, or events to prove that the analysis was made
and the instrument used was accurate, according to
standards established in Subsection (1), are admissible if:
(a) the judge finds that they were made in the
regular course of the investigation at or about
the time of the act, condition, or event; and
(b) the source of information from which made
and the method and circumstances of their preparation indicate their trustworthiness.
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established
under Subsection (1) and the conditions of Subsection
(2) have been met, there is a presumption that the
test results are valid and further foundation for introduction of the evidence is unnecessary
tm~
41-6-44.4. Person under 21 may not operate ve
hide with detectable alcohol in bod?
— Chemical test procedures — Tempo
rary license — Hearing and decision
Suspension of license or operatinj
privilege — Fees — Judicial review.
fl^ (a) As used in this section "local substanc
abuse authority" has the same meaning as pre
vided in Section 62A-8-101
(b) Calculations of blood, breath, or urine alcr
hoi concentration under this section shall h^
made in accordance with the procedures in Sufc
section 41-6-44(2).
(2) (a) A person younger than 21 years of age ma^
not operate or be in actual physical control of a
vehicle with any measurable blood, breath, or
urine alcohol concentration in his body as shown
by a chemical test,
(b) (i) A person with a valid operator license
who violates Subsection (a), in addition to
any other applicable penalties arising out of
the incident, shall have his operator license
denied or suspended as provided in Subsec
tion (ii).
(ii) (A) For a first ofTense under Subset
tion (a), the Driver License Division of
the Department of Public Safety shal1

tion for a period of 90 days beginning on
the 30th day after the date of the arrest
under Section 32A-12-209.
(B) For a second or subsequent ofTense
under Subsection (a), within three yeart
of a prior denial or suspension, tht
Driver License Division shall suspend
the person's operator license for a period
of one year beginning on the 30th day
after the date of arrest.
fc) (i) A person who has not been issued an
operator license who violates Subsection (a),
in addition to any other penalties arising out
^f the incident, shall be punished as provided
n Subsection (ii).
(ii) For one year or until he is 17, whichever is longer, a person may not operate •
vehicle and the Driver License Division maf
not issue the person an operator license or
learner's permit.
3) (a) When a peace officer has reasonable
grounds to believe that a person may be violating
or has violated Subsection (2), the peace officer
may, in connection with arresting the person for
a violation of Section 32A-12-209, request that
the person submit to a chemical test or tests to be
administered in compliance with the standards
under Section 41-6-44 10.
(b) The peace officer shall advise a person
prior to the person's submission to a chemical
test that a test result indicating a violation if
Subsection (2)(a) will result in denial or suspension of the person's license to operate a motor
vehicle or a refusal to issue a license.
(c) If the person submits to a chemical test and
the test results indicate a blood, breath, or urine
alcohol content in violation of Subsection (2MaX
or if the officer makes a determination, based Oft
reasonable grounds, that the person is otherwise
in violation of Subsection (2)(a), the officer direct*
ing administration of the test or making the determination shall serve on the person, on behalf
of the Driver License Division, immediate notice
of the Driver License Division's intention to deaf
or suspend the person's license to operateft?eM»
cle or refusal to issue a license under Subsection.
k
(2).
(4) When the officer serves immediate notice en
ehalf of the Driver License Division, he shall.'
(a) take the Utah license certificate or perms*
if any, of the operator;
(b) issue a temporary license certificate efleft*
tive for only 29 days if the driver had ft Vftftf
operator's license; and
(c) supply to the operator, on a form to be ftf>
proved by the Driver License Division, bask it*
formation regarding how to obtain ft procsfl
hearing before the Driver License Division.
(5) A citation issued by the officer may, if approves)
as to form by the Driver License Division, serve ftlftf
as the temporary license certificate under SubeecUnl
(4Kb)
(6) The peace officer serving the notice shall seal
to the Driver License Division within five daya ftftftf
the date of arrest and service of the notice:
(a) the person's driver license certificate, f
anj
*<
(b) a copy of the citation issued for the ofietMl
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(d) any other basis for the officer's determina- 41-12a-412 do not apply to a denial or suspenjatef
tion that the person has violated Subsection (2). imposed for a first offense under this section # # <
(7) (a) (i) Upon written request, the Driver Li- denial or suspension is based solely on a violation o
cense Division shall grant to the person an Subsection (2)(a).
opportunity to he heard within 29 days after
(11) (a) In addition to the penalties in SubRectioi
the date of arrest under Section 32A-12-209.
(2), a person who violates Subsection (2)(a) shal
(ii) The request shall be made within ten
be referred by the Driver License Division to th
days of the date of the arrest.
local substance abuse authority for an assess
(b) A hearing, if held, shall he before the
ment and recommendation for appropriate at
Driver License Division in the county in which
tion.
the arrest occurred, unless the Driver License Di(b) (i) Reinstatement of the person's operate
vision and the person agree that the hearing may
license or the right to obtain an operator 1
be held in some other county.
cense is contingent upon successful comph
(c) The hearing shall be documented and shall
tion of the action recommended by the locf
cover the issues of:
substance abuse authority
(i) whether a peace officer had reasonable
(ii) The local substance abuse authority
grounds to believe the person was operating
recommended action shall be determined h
a motor vehicle in violation of Subsection
an assessment of the person's alcohol abus
(2)(a);
and may include:
(ii) whether the person refused to submit
(A) a targeted education and prevei
to the test; and
tion program;
(iii) the test results, if any
(B) an early intervention program, <
(d) In connection with a hearing the Driver Li
(C) a substance abuse treatment pr
cense Division or its authorized agent may ad
gram.
minister oaths and may issue subpoenas for the
(iii) Successful completion of the recor
attendance of witnesses and the production of rel
mended action shall be determined by stai
evant books and papers.
dards established by the Division of Su
(e) One or more members of the Driver Licence
stance Abuse
Division may conduct the hearing
(c) At the conclusion of the penalty period ir
(f) Any decision made after a hearing before
posed under Subsection (2), the local substan
any number of the members of the Driver Li
abuse authority shall notify the Driver Licen
cense Division is as valid as if made after a hear
Division of the person's status regarding compl
ing before the full membership of the Driver Li
tion of the recommended action.
cense Division
(d) The local substance abuse authorities shi
(g) After the hearing, the Driver License Divi
cooperate with the Driver License Division i
aion shall order whether the person
(i) conducting the assessments;
(i) with a valid license to operate a mote
(ii) making appropriate recommendatio
vehicle will have his license denied or not o
for action; and
suspended or not; or
(iii) notifying the Driver Licence Divisi
(ii) without a valid operator license will be
about the person's status regarding comp
refused a license under Subsection (2)(c)
tion of the recommended action
(h) If the person for whom the hearing is held
(e) (i) The local substance abuse authority
fails to appear before the Driver License Division
responsible for
fts required in the notice, the division shall order
(A) the cost of the assessment of t
whether the person shall have his license denied,
person's alcohol abuse; and
suspended, or not denied or suspended, or
(B) for making a referral to an app
whether an operator license will be refused or not
priate program on the basis of the fii
refused
ings of the assessment
(8) (a) Following denial or suspension the Driver
fii) (A) The person who violated Subs
License Division shall assess against a person, ir«
tion (2)(a) is responsible for all costs s
addition to any fee imposed under Subsection
fees associated with the recommenc
63-3-205(14), a fee under Section 53-3-105, which
program to which the person is referr
shall be paid before the person's driving privilege
(B) The costs and fees under Subs?
Is reinstated, to cover administrative costs This
tion (A) shall be based on a sliding sc
fee shall be canceled if the person obtains an un
consistent with the local substai
appealed Driver License Division hearing or
abuse authority's policies and practi
court decision that the suspension was not
regarding fees for services
]
proper.
(b) A person whose operator license has been 41-6-44.5. Admissibility of chemical test resi
denied, suspended, or postponed by the Driver
in actions for driving under the inl
License Division under this section may file a
ence — Weight of evidence.
petition within 30 days after the suspension for a
tl) (a) In any civil or criminal action or proceed
hearing on the matter which, if held, is governed
in which it is material to prove that a person '
by Section 53-3-224
operating or in actual physical control of a vi
9) After reinstatement of an operator license for a
cle while under the influence of alcohol or dr
Ant offense under this section, a report authorized
or with a blood or breath alcohol content st*
•ftder Section 53-3-104 may not contain evidence of
torily prohibited, the results of a chemical tes
1M denial or suspension of the person's operator litests as authorized in Section 41-6-44 10 are
Vslftt under this section if he has not been convicted
missible as evidence

